A Phishing Case Study of Facebook and Google
brought to you by IBM. In this video, you will understand the timeline of
events of the phishing scam, learn about what
actions were taken by the threat actor
and the companies, and learn what the impacts
of the attacks were. As Adam mentioned
in his last video, the results of a phishing
attack can be costly and have major impacts for
both the individual who has fallen victim
to the attack and the organization or company
who was falsely represented. I'm Corine from IBM Security
Learning Services Team and I'll be taking you through several case studies
throughout the course. You should note that format of the case studies as
I am reviewing them. You will be asked in your peer-to-peer project
not only to review a specific type of attack in
more detail but to represent public data on a company or individual that was a
victim of the attack. Let's take a detailed
look at what happened as part of
the phishing attack. In summary, according to the US attorney's office for the Southern District
of New York, scammers stole over $100 million from Facebook and Google
in a creative way. Basically, they e-mailed
the tech giants and asked for it. The scheme that included
setting up a fake business and sending phishing e-mails to employees of Facebook and Google. The scheme ultimately duped those multi-million dollar
companies out of more than a hundred million in
total between 2013 and 2015. Here is a timeline of the attack. Prosecutors accused
Rimasauskas in 2016 of incorporating company that posed as another company, Taiwan based Quanta Computer, which actually does business
with Facebook and Google. Authority says
Rimasauskas served as the sole member of the board of directors of the fake company. He opened, maintained,
and control various accounts of banks in the name of the fake company. Starting in 2013, Rimasauskas and his
co-conspirators created fairly convincing
forgery e-mails. They use fake e-mail accounts, which look like they were
sent by employees of the actual Quanta
company in Taiwan. They sent phishing e-mails with fake invoices to
employees at Facebook and Google who regularly conducted multi-million dollar
transactions with Quanta. After receiving the e-mails, those employees
responded by paying out more than $100 million to the fake company's bank accounts. Prosecutors furthermore said
in their statement that Rimasauskas work also
involved forging invoices, contracts, and letters that falsely appeared to have
been executed and signed by executives and agents of the companies he was
impersonating and pleasing. The scheme tried to avoid
suspicion from banks by creating false supporting
documents for the transactions, which even had fake
corporate seals and boss with the names
of those companies. The scam took $98 million
from Facebook in 2015. Rimasauskas extracted
$23 million from Google, but both companies have recovered most of
that money since the scheme was discovered and
Rimasauskas was arrested. He was ultimately sentenced to 30 years in prison
in July of 2019. Even tech giants like
Google and Facebook were susceptible to a
targeted phishing attack. Let's take a quick look at where they were the most vulnerable. Note, some of the
breathless headlines about Rimasauskas'
case indicating that he just asked for the
money are selling short the sophistication
with which he conducted his
fraudulent scheme. A lot of careful forgery
and knowledge of the internal finance workings of the involved companies is needed to pull these attacks off. The FBI warns that
attackers will often use malware compromised accounts to breach the target network
in advance and lay low, observing the billion systems and internal communications for weeks before making any kind of move. For Google and Facebook, the main vulnerabilities
were, spear phishing. The attack targeted the
finance team as they would have the authority
to pay the invoices. Systems. Due to the fact that this was a
business as usual, any threat systems were bypassed. People, this was a normal part of the finance teams job
dealing with Quanta. So no one suspected the threat. Delayed response, $100
million and payments were taken from Facebook and Google due to a lack of detection. So what was the cost
of this breach? The scam to $98 million from Facebook in 2015
as I noted before, and Rimasauskas extracted
over 23 million from Google. Both companies have recovered most of the money
since the scheme was discovered and Rimasauskas was
arrested and plead guilty. He was sentenced to 30 years
in prison for his actions. I would add a fourth cost
of negative publicity. Anytime there's a
media about a breach, the company's vulnerabilities
are exploited. So what are some of the
ways that this breach or other phishing attacks
can be prevented. So let's review a few of them. Most countries and localities
have protections against the registration of identical or overly
similar company names. Rimasauskas took advantage of relatively loose roles in Latvia, which has had ongoing issues with fraudulent company
registrations driven by its popularity as a
place to launder money. Communications coming
from countries known for this phishing scam can
be an early warning, particularly a business
partners were not previously known to
have a presence there. If a fraudster does manage to orchestrate a scheme
such as this, early detection is critical. These attacks is usually carried out by organized
groups that will immediately use meals to launder
the money once received. Regular reviews of invoices and payment related
communications for accuracy can help
tremendously in this case. Checking documents to verify that all the contact
information remains consistent over time can provide vital early warning
that something is off. It is also possible to adjust payment processes to
bake protections against business e-mail compromise
into normal procedure. One idea is to implement two-factor authentication
whenever a payment is made. For example, require
phone verification. Let's also discuss some other phishing attack
prevention techniques. E-mail systems can be tweaked to do things like
automatically flag any messages where the from and reply addresses do
not exactly match, or to automatically
display text coming from an internal company account
in a certain color. This will help to
more quickly identify communications from
a phishing site. Employees should be educated
and training sessions conducted with Mac
fishing scenarios. Your organization can deploy a spam filter that
detects viruses, blank centers, or
other information that may not be standard
e-mail practices. All systems should
be kept current with the latest security
patches and updates. An antivirus solution
should be installed with regularly scheduled
signature updates and monitoring of the antivirus
status on all equipment. A security policy should be
developed that includes but isn't limited to password
expiration and complexity. A web filter may be deployed
to block malicious websites. All sensitive company
information should be encrypted. Finally, convert HTML e-mail
into text-only e-mail messages or disable
HTML e-mail messages. Please check out the
additional resources to see two full articles outlining this phishing scam and
also an article on Latvia. Adam will now discuss an overview of a
point of sale attack. I will be back to discuss another case study later
in this course. Thank you.